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STATUTES
Rule 609, Utah Rule of Evidence (1990) .
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(d) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1990) whereby a defendant may take an appeal to
the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction.

In this

case final judgment and conviction was rendered by the Honorable
Paul G. Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Third Circuit Court, in
and for Salt Lake City, State of Utah.

- iii -

TEXTS OF STATUTESy RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1990) provides in part:
(a) General rule.

For the purpose of attacking the

credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying
Mr. Holtman's motion to suppress his prior conviction?

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 900177-CA
Priority #2

GLENN E. HOLTMAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable
Paul G. Grant, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake City, State
of Utah.

A jury found Mr. Holtman guilty of Retail Theft, a class B

Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinances, § 11.36.060
after a trial held on January 24, 1990.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 28, 1989, Mr. Holtman and his brother Jason were
browsing in Nordstrom's Department Store (R. 28). Mr. Holtman, the
defendant, walked up to the sunglasses counter and asked to try on
several pair of sunglasses (R. 29). He tried on the pairs putting
his own sunglasses on the counter with the other sunglasses (R.
30).

After walking back and forth to a mirror several times he

reboxed the sunglasses, waited to return them to the sales person,
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and then left with his brother (R. 31). He put what he thought were
his sunglasses on his head and walked out of the store at which
point he was arrested (R. 31).
At trial, immediately before Mr. Holtman, the defendant,
took the stand, counsel for defendant made a motion under Rule
609(a)(1) and (2) to exclude evidence of the defendant's prior
conviction for grand larceny in Virginia.

The motion was denied

primarily because, as the trial court noted, the crimes were so
similar in nature that the prior conviction was probative on the
issue of intent and would aid the jury in judging the defendant's
credibility.

(R. 24). Counsel for the City indicated originally

that she would only ask if there had been a prior felony conviction
should the defendant take the stand (R. 23). After the motion was
denied counsel for the defense asked the counsel for the City what
she was going to ask on cross-examination concerning the prior
conviction (R. 25). Her response was that she would ask if the
defendant had ever been convicted of a felony and, if so, what the
crime was and when it was committed (R. 25, inaudible response
reconstructed by stipulation between counsel).

Defense counsel

elicited this information on direct examination of Mr. Holtman (R.
32).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Holtman's motion to
suppress his conviction for grand larceny pursuant to Rule 609, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

The probative value of the conviction did not
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outweigh its prejudicial effect; furthermore, the conviction was not
for a crime of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of
subsection 2 of Rule 609(a).

Such error was reversible, since it

was most likely used by the jury as evidence of Mr, Holtman's intent
to steal, the only issue at trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
MR. HOLTMAN'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF
HIS PRIOR CONVICTION.
At trial defense counsel moved to suppress Mr. Holtman's
prior conviction pursuant to Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (R.
21-25).

Mr. Holtman's prior conviction which the state would have

used for impeachment purposes consisted of a 1988 conviction in
Virginia for Grand Larceny (R. 32, inaudible portion agreed to by
stipulation).

The trial court denied the motion (R. 23-24).

Because of the trial court's ruling, defense counsel elicited from
the defendant on direct examination that he had been convicted of
grand larceny in Virginia (R. 32, inaudible portion agreed to by
stipulation).

A.
The prior conviction was not admissible
under 609(a)(1).
Rule 609(a)(1) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the
- 3 -

law which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of
admitting the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant [.]
The Utah Supreme Court has summarized the factors to be considered
in balancing probative value against prejudicial effect as follows:

[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on
the veracity of the witness . . . .
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the
prior conviction . . . .
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to
the charged crime, insofar as a close
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the
accused as a bad person . . . .
[4] the importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tried
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . .
[5] the importance of the accused's
testimony, as perhaps warranting the
exclusion of convictions, probative of the
accused's character for veracity . . . .
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986)(citations omitted).
The burden of proving that the probative value of the
conviction, in that its admission tells something about defendant's
credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect of its admission is on
the prosecution.

Banner at 1334.

In the present case the City

offered no evidence or explanation as to how the prior conviction
was probative of Mr. Holtman's character for truth and veracity (R.
22-23).

In looking at the factors outlined by the Banner Court,

three out of five weigh heavily in favor of suppressing the
conviction.
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Mr. Holtman was on trial for a retail theft, the prior
felony conviction was for grand larceny, a theft crime. This
similarity could have caused the jury to do just what the trial
court suggested it was proper for the jury to do, that is the jury
could have used the fact of a prior theft to decide whether or not
Mr. Holtman had intended to steal the glasses or merely walked out
thinking he had his own glasses with him.
that he made an innocent mistake.

Mr. Holtman's defense was

By allowing the jury to hear

evidence of a prior felony theft, the jury had less incentive to
evaluate whether or not Mr. Holtman's actions in this case were
innocent.

The Banner Court's concern with punishment of the accused
I
because of prior crimes is implicated here.
In addition to factor [3] weighing on the side of
suppression, factors [4] and [5] do, too.
nontestimonial evidence.
only his intentions.

There was no decisive

Mr. Holtman's actions were not contested,

Credibility of the witnesses was critical to

the jury's determination.

Two security guards testified for the

City that Mr. Holtman's actions were suspicious and that he
evidenced behavior proving he was trying to steal the sunglasses.
Mr. Holtman's brother testified to some collateral matters.
Mr. Holtman alone testified to his innocent intentions and confusion
in trying on the sunglasses.

Therefore, Mr. Holtman's testimony was

essential to make out his defense.

His own credibility with the

jury was the only evidence they could rely on to determine whose
perceptions were correct.

- 5 _

Factor number [2] perhaps weighs in favor of admissions,
but by itself recentness or remoteness is the least important of the
factors.

Factor number [1] is the most problematic.

If this factor

involves the same evaluation as used under 609(a)(2), than, as
argued below, a theft crime without more information is not
probative of veracity.

However, if there is a lower threshold to be

applied here, a theft crime might be probative of veracity.
However, because this trial is for a theft crime, credibility is at
issue, and it is necessary for the defendant to testify, even if a
theft crime might be probative, its prejudicial effect outweighs any
marginally probative value it might have.
Finally, the trial court's ruling indicates that the
conviction is admissible for substantive reasons.

The court's

analysis is that the prior conviction is probative of the
defendant's intent.

This is inappropriate, but probably indicates

exactly how the jury used the evidence of Mr. Holtman's prior
conviction.
The trial court's denial of Mr. Holtman's motion to
suppress his prior conviction was error under 609(a)(1).

B. The prior conviction was not admissible
under 609(a)(2).
Rule 609(a)(2) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if
the crime . . . (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of punishment.
- 6 -

Theft crimes are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false
statement, unless there is an element of fraud or deceit involved
that "bearfs] directly on the likelihood that the defendant will
testify truthfully."

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989)

(citations omitted).

Under 609(a)(2) Utah courts have found

inadmissible prior convictions for robbery and burglary,
State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989); retail theft and
attempted burglary, Bruce at 656; misdemeanor theft, State v. Brown,
771 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah App. 1989); aggravated robbery,
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1988).
The City once again had the burden of showing Mr. Holtman's
prior conviction for grand larceny involved deceit or dishonesty.
Brown at 1094.

In addition, the trial court must inquire into the

underlying facts before a conviction is admissible under 609(a)(2).
Brown at 1094; Wight at 18. Neither did the City provide
information or the underlying facts, nor did the trial court
investigate further than defense counsel's proffer that Mr. Holtman
merely carried keys in a car theft scheme and never made any
representations to any victims indicating a tendency to lie. (R. 22).
Mr. Holtman's prior conviction is a theft crime; however,
there is no evidence in the record of any fraud or deceit on the
defendant's part.

The trial court's denial of Mr. Holtman's motion

to suppress his prior conviction was error under 609(a)(2).

C. The refusal to suppress admission of the
prior conviction was prejudicial error.
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[T]he standard for error in cases involving
a wrongful failure to exclude prior
convictions is whether "there was 'a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant.1"
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court has found prejudicial error in

circumstances where the prior conviction was admitted, and

[t]he evidence of the defendant's guilt . . .
was far from overwhelming.
State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989).
In the present case the only issue was Mr. Holtman's intent
to steal the sunglasses.

The evidence against him consisted of two

witnesses who described his behavior as suspicious (R. 4 & 15). His
own testimony was that he had made on honest mistake and picked up
the wrong sunglasses before he left (R. 31-32).

Mr. Holtman's

testimony was completely negated by the trial courts denial of
defendant's motion to suppress his prior theft conviction.

The jury

heard that Mr. Holtman had been convicted of felony theft no more
than one year earlier.

His credibility was reduced in the jury's

eyes by a fact that has very little to do with credibility.

The

jury should have been allowed to deliberate in this case without the
distraction the prior conviction created.

Mr. Holtman's actions at

the time of the alleged retail theft should have been left to speak
for themselves through the testimony of the witnesses for the City
and through Mr. Holtman himself.

He should have been judged not as
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an ex-felon engaged in suspicious behavior and therefore found
guilty, but as a young man acting as he did one day in Nordstroms.
The denial of the motion to suppress was prejudicial error.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
Glen E. Holtman, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/Q ^day of August, 1990.

RT L. STEELE
rney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert L. Steele, do hereby certify that I mailed four
copies of the foregoing brief of appellant to Janice Frost of the
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 451 South 200 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this

(A)

day of August, 1990.
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
City Prosecutor's Office, 451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

day of August, 1990.
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